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Abstract 
Given the substantial suffering of enslavement, why didn’t more slaves revolt 
during the Middle Passage of the Atlantic Slave Trade? We argue that the 
collective action problem was an important impediment to revolt. Revolts nearly 
always resulted in slave casualties, and crews tortured and killed conspirators. 
Overthrowing the crew benefited all of the slaves, so each slave had an incentive 
to free ride on others’ efforts to secure freedom. Using a rational choice 
framework, we argue that slaves could more effectively overcome the collective 
action problem when there were fewer slaves aboard, fewer male slaves, and 
when the slaves were more homogenous. Data on slave voyages from 1750 to 
1775 and archival and historical documents support these claims. 
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1. Introduction 
Given the substantial suffering of enslavement, why didn’t more slaves revolt during the Middle 
Passage of the Atlantic Slave Trade? A revolt by slaves against the crew is a classic case where 
the collective action problem can prevent production of a public good. All of the slaves on a ship 
enjoy the benefits of overthrowing the crew and regaining their freedom. However, 
accomplishing this task requires each individual to take risky actions that often results in torture 
and death. Each slave prefers to enjoy the benefits of freedom without bearing the substantial 
cost of helping to obtain it. As a result, each slave rationally chooses to free ride and no one is 
freed. Consistent with this, the historical record shows that slave revolts did not occur frequently. 
Estimates suggest that slaves revolted, at most, in as many as 8 to 10 percent of voyages, but the 
most reliable estimates suggest it may have been as few as only 2 percent of voyages (Behrendt, 
Eltis, and Richardson, 2001, 456). While the study of slave revolt on plantations has received 
substantial interest (Aptheker, 1943; Hummel, 1996), the more difficult revolution challenge—
revolt during middle passage—has been neglected in the existing literature.1 
Would-be participants could not rely on solutions commonly found in the context of 
political revolution (Lichbach 1994). 2  Outside parties almost never aided slaves during the 
Middle Passage, so the slaves had to rely on self-organization to overthrow the crew. Unlike 
many instances of political revolution, the potential conspirators did not choose to participate or 
live in the affected region—there were no voluntary entrance or exit options. Slaves could not 
recruit new members, arrange for outside finance, alter their membership, or increase their 
resources to affect collective action. In addition, crews controlled slaves with severe physical 
1 Fogel and Stanley Engerman (1974) is a seminal work using economics to understand slavery. Several superb 
pieces offer rational choice explanations for overcoming the collection action problem of revolt among maritime 
trading merchants and pirate crews (Leeson, 2007a, 2009, 2010a, 2010b).  
2  The collective action problem of revolution has been studied extensively in a variety of contexts and with 
numerous methods (Mason, 1984; Muller and Opp, 1986; Bendor and Mookherjee, 1987; Klosko, Muller, and Opp, 
1987; Finkel, Muller, and Opp, 1989; Lichbach, 1994, 1995, 1996; Goldstone, 1994; Moore, 1995; Kuran, 1989, 
1991, 1997; Esteban and Ray, 2001; Goldstone, 2001, 2002; Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon, 2009; Olsson-
Yaousiz 2010, 2012 Leeson, 2010a). 
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constraints and poor conditions. The solutions available had to be self-organized, bottom-up, and 
lack an outside patron or organizer. Moreover, slaves lacked much of the freedom that maritime 
sailors relied on to develop contractual solutions to predation and abuse.3 This paper argues that, 
in addition to physical constraints, the collective action problem was an important impediment to 
revolt.  
 
2. Model and Hypotheses 
Historians have written extensively about the Atlantic Slave Trade, but their focus has avoided 
shipboard slave resistance. For many years, the professional consensus depicted slavery from the 
perspective of the slaveholder, with some scholars portraying enslaved Africans as passively 
accepting their fate (Elkins, 1976). While most historians no longer hold this view and the Elkins 
thesis has been severely criticized, slave resistance is still ‘arguably the most understudied area 
of slave trade studies’ (Diouf, 2003, x). What does exist focuses on either resistance in Africa or 
in the New World colonies (Thornton, 1998, 272-303). When slave resistance is studied, 
‘shipboard revolt is largely absent’ (Taylor, 2006, 5).  
Past explanations for revolt include slave mistreatment, excessive leniency, managerial 
ineptitude, reduction in crew strength due to illness, shipboard crisis, crew disunity or 
negligence, the numerical advantages of the slaves, and spontaneous uprising (Greene, 1944, 
346-55; Wax, 1966, 1-15; Uya, 1976, 65-88; Miller, 1988, 151-58; McGowan, 1990, 5-29; 
Inikori, 1996, 53-92; Behrendt et al, 2001, 454-476; Taylor, 2006, 15-66). Some historians have 
discounted the rationality of slaves, suggesting ‘the decision to rebel did not come about by 
evaluating the situation completely rationally and selecting the most logical solution’ (Taylor, 
2006, 66). We argue, on the contrary, that the key to explaining onboard insurrection requires 
adopting a rational choice framework to identify the collective action problem facing slaves. 
3 A similar instance where collective revolt faced a substantial difficulty was in concentration camps (Maher, 2010). 
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The paper builds on the empirical work conducted in three important past examinations 
of onboard slave resistance. Behrendt, Eltis, and Richardson (2001) conduct a series of univariate 
difference of means tests and a single logit regression for ships that experienced resistance, and 
they tentatively conclude that African region and the proportion of male slaves explain when 
revolt occurs. They suggest that gender roles in West Africa drive their results. Taylor (2006) 
provides the most recent and comprehensive listing of known slave resistances. While he 
discusses many factors that might explain the patterns of resistance, he concludes, ‘in the end, 
rebellions could occur under any circumstance’ (Taylor, 2006, 66). Richardson (2001) 
emphasizes the importance of the political economy of the African slave supply regions, but he 
concedes, ‘the conditions that increased the propensity of slaves to rebel are obscure’ 
(Richardson 2001, 75). None of these sources considers the collective action problem, and we 
are aware of only one brief discussion of it in the Middle Passage literature (Rediker, 2007, 292). 
The traditional exposition of the paradox of revolution follows Tullock (1971, 1974). In 
the context of slave revolt, the rational slave estimates the probability, given his lack of 
participation, that a revolt will be successful, p, and that it will fail, 1-p. If the slave revolt 
succeeds, he benefits A; if it fails he benefits B, with (A > B). The slave anticipates that his 
marginal contribution to increasing the probability of a successful slave revolt is pp and the risk 
of punishment from participating is C > 0. The rational slave’s expected payoffs from 
participating in revolt are therefore: 
Uabstain = Ap + B(1-p)       (1) 
Uparticipate  = A(p+pp) + B(1-(p+pp)) – C    (2) 
The typical assumption is that when there are a large number of people, the marginal 
contribution of a particular person’s participation is low, such that pp = 0. From this, formula (2) 
becomes: 
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Uparticipate = Ap + B(1-p) – C      (3) 
With C > 0, the greater expected payoff for the rational slave is to abstain from participation in a 
revolt always. However, among smaller groups the marginal contribution of a particular person’s 
participation increases, with pp > 0. When pp is sufficiently large, the rational slave participates 
in the insurrection. This is the intuition in Olson’s (1971, 35) seminal analysis, wherein he 
explains, “the larger the group, the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a 
collective good.” This suggests our first hypothesis,  
Hypothesis 1: Slave revolt is more likely when there are fewer slaves onboard. 
Smaller groups can facilitate public good provision more effectively than larger groups can. 
Small groups can monitor the contributions of each member more closely, and each individual 
contribution is more important to the production of the public good, so individuals are less likely 
to free ride on others’ efforts.  
Slaves needed to communicate with each other in order to plan a revolt, signal the 
beginning of a revolt, react in unison during it, and maintain control of the ship afterwards. 
Communication also allowed slaves to use public shaming to induce participation. People who 
share the same history, culture, language, and social identity face lower costs of successfully 
engaging in collective action than strangers who cannot communicate with each other. This is a 
commonly recognized impediment to cooperation and public good provision (for instance 
Leeson 2007b; Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein 2007). 
Hypothesis 2: Slave revolt is more likely when the slaves share an ethnic and  
lingual community.  
We examine these hypotheses with both quantitative and qualitative evidence. The qualitative 
sources come primarily from archival materials—newspapers, ship logs, letters, accounts written 
by veterans of the trade, and even narratives written by survivors of the Middle Passage. These 
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primary documents provide details of the history of shipboard slave insurrections and are vital to 
the study of shipboard revolt. The quantitative data comes from Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic 
Slave Trade Database. This dataset, which is now available through a website funded by the 
National Endowment for the Humanities, the W.E.B. Du Bois Institute for Afro-American 
Research at Harvard, and Emory University, provides details for 34,948 voyages, which have 
helped facilitate the study of cultural, demographic, and economic change in the Atlantic world 
from the late sixteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries. Nearly all historical assessments of the trade 
written after this database’s release have used this quantitative data, and its reliability is well 
established within the historical literature. 
 
3. Transatlantic slave trade and middle passage 
3.1. Historical overview 
The Atlantic Slave Trade ‘was the largest intercontinental migration in world history before the 
nineteenth century,’ forcibly relocating an estimated twelve million people to the New World 
between 1515 and 1866 (Curtin, 1971, 302; also Thornton, 1998). To understand the nature and 
difficulty of slave revolt, it is imperative to examine the process of capture and enslavement prior 
to the slave’s transition into European hands. Military enslavement in the aftermath of war was 
the most typical form (Thornton, 1998, 99; Rediker, 2007, 98). One witness of the trade 
described war as the ‘robbery of inland, defenseless creatures, who are hurried down the coast 
with the greater cruelty… [of] a very poor life’ (Atkins, 1735, 176). War was a ‘euphemism for 
the organized theft of human beings’ (Rediker, 2007, 99). Judicial servitude was a second 
prominent process of enslavement. African societies sentenced criminals to slavery. Many 
Africans and European abolitionists thought that the judicial processes in West Africa had been 
corrupted so that ‘all Punishments are chang’d into Slavery…they strain for crimes very hard in 
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order to get the benefit of selling the criminal…every trifling crime is punished in the same 
manner’ (Moore, 1738, 29-30).  
Many slaves were forced to travel great distances to reach the West African coast, 
especially as the areas around the coast had been exhausted of its human supply. Since the 
presence of European ships on the coast was intermittent, once along the coast, slaves waited in 
barracoons until a European trader appeared. While confined here, ‘large numbers of slaves 
accumulated within these pens…squatting helplessly, naked, on the dirt and entirely exposed to 
the skies… [they] slept in their own excrement, without even a bonfire for warmth’ (Miller, 
1988, 390). During meals, ‘ten or twelve of them feed together out of a trough, precisely like so 
many hogs; there is even less care taken of them than of brutes’ (Wadstrom, 1787, 29).  
Once purchased, slave traders forced them into small vessels and then ferried them to a 
larger slaving vessel anchored offshore. Before boarding these smaller ships, the ‘men were all 
put into irons, two and two shackled together to prevent mutiny’ (Phillips, 1930 [1693-1694], 
402). These slaves, as Middle Passage survivor Ottobah Cugoano noted, encountered a ‘most 
horrible scene’ where nothing could ‘be heard but rattling of chains, smacking of whips, and 
groans and cries of fellow men, some would not stir from the ground when they were lashed and 
beat in the most horrible manner’ (Cugoano, 1787, 9). In the process of boarding the ship, the 
Africans were so ‘willful and loth to leave their own country’ that many times they ‘leap’d out of 
canoes’ where they would stay ‘under water till they were drowned’ (Phillips, 1930, 402). For 
the slaves who boarded the ship, ‘an iron collar and chain were fastened to their necks’ and both 
legs were “put into irons” as they were forced below the ship’s deck (Clarkson, 1789, 57). 
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3.2. The collective action problem of revolt 
The most difficult experience of enslavement remained—the Middle Passage. A former slave 
described his experience as he was ‘put down under the decks’ where he ‘received such a 
salutation in [his] nostrils as [he] had ever experienced…so that with the loathsomeness of the 
stench and crying together, [he] became so sick and low that he was not able to eat’ (Equiano, 
1791, 51-52). While below the deck of the ship, captives were chained together in holds that 
were designed to house the maximum number of slaves. Slaves had as little as three feet of room 
between the floor and ceiling (Taylor, 2006, 28). A second layer was built so that another group 
of slaves could be loaded above (Taylor, 2006, 28). On average, slaves spent eleven weeks in 
these conditions during Middle Passage, with mortality rates averaging about 10 percent for the 
entirety of the trade (Behrendt et al, 2001, 454). Approximately 1.5 million slaves died during 
Middle Passage (Taylor, 2006, 37). In addition to these terrible conditions, other problems like 
spoilage of food, shortage of water, and endemic diseases were ubiquitous.4 
In order for Africans to rebel, they needed to overcome a number of problems. They 
needed to free themselves from their iron manacles, shackles, and chains. Insurrectionists had to 
find a way through the locked, fortified gratings of the hold to reach the ship’s deck. This task 
presented substantial difficulties, as slave ships were built and organized to prevent insurrection 
(Rediker, 2007, 292). Slaves then needed to overcome the armed crew, who averaged about 
thirty men on the typical slaving voyage. Even if successful until this point, Africans would then, 
unless still in sight of the African coast, need to sail the ship to a location where they could 
reclaim their freedom, either at home or to a coastline where slave traders were absent. This last 
difficulty led many Europeans to ‘commonly imagine, the Negroes Ignorance of Navigation will 
always be a Safeguard’ against the possibility of slave insurrection (Atkins 1735, 175). Because 
4 For more information on mortality, see Steckel and Jensen (1986). 
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almost all slaves lacked experience sailing, this proved to be a significant problem for would-be 
revolutionaries.  
In order to overcome these physical constraints, slaves needed to act collectively. Taylor 
argues that ‘the success of any attempted rebellion ultimately lay not in the intelligence or 
cunning of its leader or facilitators but in the numerical advantage resulting from all or most of 
the Africans fighting together as one determined body for one common goal’ (Taylor, 2006, 94). 
Slave resistance often failed because of an insufficient number of slaves participating. In 1788, 
for example, slave revolt aboard the French ship Licorne ultimately proved futile because only a 
portion of the 446 slaves on board participated (Taylor, 2006, 80). In general, slave participation 
during insurrection was tentative, and many slaves were afraid, apathetic, and even antagonistic 
to revolt (Taylor, 2006, 107).  
Overcoming the collective action problem was difficult for several reasons. First, the 
cramped and filthy space made cooperation difficult, and the extreme scarcity of the holdings led 
to hostility among the slaves. The conditions of the holding area drove slaves to madness, and as 
one historian explains, ‘in their frenzy some killed others in the hope of procuring more room to 
breathe. Men strangled those next to them, and women drove nails into each other’s brains’ 
(Bennett, 1969, 41).5 Second, they had to avoid detection by slave crews who were vigilant 
against revolt. The crew singled out and punished Africans who they suspected of conspiracy 
(Taylor, 2006, 69). In addition to avoiding detection by crews, slaves had to prevent their 
conspirators from informing crewmembers. The crew enticed slaves to inform them about plans 
of revolt by offering privileges and benefits, so slaves were uncertain about who was trustworthy 
(Taylor 2006, 77-79).6 In at least two cases, slaves were given their freedom for tipping off or 
sabotaging revolts (Taylor, 2006, 108). The Rhode Island ship Mary in 1796 avoided rebellion 
5 Of course, the difficulty of coordination does not preclude the possibility of using other cues and low effort 
coordination devises to elicit cooperation (e.g. Manzini, Sadrieh and Vriend 2009). 
6 Slave crews also hired Africans to act as “guardians” over slaves (Smallwood 2007). 
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when the ship’s first mate was ‘informd by one of our Slaves that was not confined but on deck 
as a Sailor, that the Slaves had intentions of taking the ship’ (Donnan, 1930, 374-375). Because 
of this information, the life of one crewmember was saved and the informant was offered 
freedom upon reaching the coast. Slaves could also defect to the side of the crew during a revolt. 
In 1704, a slave aboard the Eagle saved a crewmember ‘when a young lad about seventeen years 
old, whom we [the slavers] had been kind to, interposed his arm and received the blow’ which 
had been intended to kill the sailor (Snelgrave, 1734, 167-168). The young man was given 
freedom upon arriving in the Americas.  
Participation in slave resistance carried substantial risks. The moment of revolt was 
dangerous, and casualties during the initial insurrection were common. As a retired slaving 
captain explained, ‘an attempt to rise upon the ship’s company brings on instantaneous and 
horrid war; for, when they are once in motion, they are desperate; and where they do not 
conquer, they are seldom quelled without much bloodshed on both sides’ (Newton, 1788, 15-16). 
Estimates suggest that an average of 25 to 32 slaves died during an insurrection, though this 
might overestimate deaths because revolts with no or fewer deaths are less likely to have been 
reported (Richardson, 2001, 74; Taylor, 2006, 115). 
Slaves also faced substantial costs if revolt failed. Jean Barbot advised ship captains to 
‘Spare no effort to repress their insolence and, as an example to the others, sacrifice the lives of 
all the most mutinous. This will terrify the others and keep them obedient. The way of making it 
clear to them, I mean the form of punishment that scares Africans most, is buy cutting up a live 
man with an ax and handing out the pieces to the others’ (Harms, 2002, 272; Taylor, 2006, 113, 
also 112-118). A female slave who participated in a revolt was tied up by her thumbs and slashed 
with knives until she died (Atkins, 1735, 72-73; Taylor, 2006, 90). The surgeon on the ship Pearl 
sliced open the back of twelve conspirators and rubbed saltwater in the wounds (Taylor, 2006, 
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113). After a failed revolt on another ship, the crew tied one rebellious boy up with bricks and 
threw him overboard (Taylor, 2006, 113). 
Given these obstacles, it seems unlikely that rebellion would ever occur. Rebellions did 
take place in perhaps as many as 8 to 10 percent of slave voyages (Behrendt, Eltis, and 
Richardson, 2001, 456). 7 Recorded cases of revolt with documentation provide 493 specific 
instances of shipboard resistance (Taylor, 2006, 9). Initiating a revolt did not guarantee success, 
but slaves did gain freedom in at least 120 rebellions (Taylor, 2006, 135). This rarely resulted in 
a return to their former lives, however, as slaves hardly ever returned to Africa (Behrendt, Eltis, 
and Richardson, 2001). Most acts of slave resistance failed to achieve their goal of freedom, but 
the ever-present threat of revolt did have a beneficial effect. The additional cost of preventing 
slave revolt reduced the volume of the slave trade by an estimated nine percent, leading to 
roughly 600,000 fewer slaves shipped to the Americas over the course of the trade (Behrendt, 
Eltis, and Richardson, 2001). 
 
4. Evidence on slave revolts 
4.1. Total slaves and total male slaves 
Our analysis uses data from 1750 to 1775. This particular period is subject to less reporting bias 
than other periods (Taylor, 2006, 9; Behrendt et al, 2001, 455). The period saw the widespread 
circulation of newspapers that reported on slave revolts. Because ship-owners and investors 
placed much of the blame for Middle Passage revolt on a ship’s captain, there was a ‘great 
incentive [for the captain] to keep certain things quiet, since a substantial part of a captain’s 
reputation in the slave trade…depended on his ability to control the Africans aboard his vessel 
and keep losses to a minimum’ (Taylor, 2006, 3). Much of the data prior to 1750 is based on 
7 Slaves also engaged in more subtle resistance in the form of self-mutilation, suicide, and invoking religious curses 
and warfare (Bly, 1998). 
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private ship logs kept by the captain and company records created from these logs, biasing the 
data of onboard slave insurrection. During the 1750s in England ‘there were seventeen [new] 
daily, tri-weekly, and weekly newspapers circulating in London alone and another 40 in the 
provinces’ and during this time ‘stories from slave colonies and slave voyages began to form the 
subject matter of their columns in a way that commerce in long-distance non-human 
commodities never had’ (Eltis and Engerman, 2010, 149). It is far more likely that a record of 
revolt would exist after this time because newspapers obtained reports of revolt from sailors, 
rather than relying only on the word of captains who may have had an incentive to conceal these 
reports. The 1760s and 1770s compose the period when ‘reports of slave revolts in newspapers 
are their most frequent’ (Eltis and Engerman, 2010, 152).8 
The data during this period also include the English maritime newspaper Lloyd’s List, 
which is ‘perhaps the most comprehensive and independent single source for eighteenth century 
British ships’ (Eltis, 2000, 18; Richardson, 2001, 72). Improved data during this period is not 
limited to the British slave trade alone. Records still exist in their entirety for the French port of 
Nantes whose authorities required returning slave ship captains to submit detailed accounts of 
completed voyages, which contain ‘the least reporting bias [for insurrection]…of any national 
sources’ (Behrendt et al, 2001, 457). 
Several events make data after 1775 less reliable or useful. The best French records exist 
only until 1777. The outbreak of the American Revolution in 1776 and the French Revolution 
likely led to less representative public records of the slave trade. The British slave trade may 
‘have reached its peak [in 1775] before…the American Revolution’ and the growing abolitionist 
movement either outlawed the trade or regulated the conditions on ship, making later periods 
problematic for comparison (Richardson, 1987, 241). In sum, the dissemination of information 
through print media, public records, world events, and the abolitionist movement makes 1750 to 
8 See Eltis (2009) on the reporting of slave shipboard insurrections and Black (1987) on 18th century newspapers. 
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1775 the least biased sample available and includes the height of the trade (there were more 
voyages in this period than any other 25-year period).  
Slaves were not randomly assigned to a particular voyage, as slave traders sometimes 
actively and consciously chose the number and mix of slaves to bring aboard. However, this is 
not problematic empirically because the slaves themselves could not self-sort onto particular 
voyages. From their perspective, their fellow shipmates were an exogenous factor. 
Our sample contains 5,946 observations of slave voyages, including 152 instances of 
revolt. However, many of the regressions have substantially fewer observations because of 
missing data. We created a dummy variable for revolt, which is labeled 1 for those voyages that 
experienced insurrection (144 observations), those where a substantial insurrection was planned 
but thwarted by the slave ship captain and crew (7 observations), and those where the original 
source labeled the insurrection “cut-off” (1 observation).9 The comparison group is labeled 0 and 
includes all other observations in the dataset. As our dependent variable is dichotomous—either 
the voyage resulted in a revolt or not—a logit model is appropriate and corresponds to our 
underlying theory of slave revolt.  
We estimate a model of slave revolt (SR) using a logit regression 
(1)  SRi  = β0 + β1Zi + εi, 
where SRi = 1 if a slave revolt occurred and 0 otherwise and Zi is a matrix of variables of 
interest. Two variables—the total number of slaves onboard and total male slaves—address our 
hypotheses directly. The other variables in the matrix were selected based on prior explanations 
for revolt and include the number of days the ship was slaving, whether slaves were from the 
Upper Guinea region, the percentage of child slaves, the number of crewmembers at the outset of 
9 This definition of revolt follows both the Voyages database and past research on slave revolts (Behrendt et al, 
2001; Richardson, 2001). 
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the voyage, crew deaths during Middle Passage, and crew deaths along the African coast. Table 
1 provides summary statistics.   
Our first hypothesis predicts that ships with a smaller number of slaves will be more 
likely to revolt. The individual slave’s choice to participate in the revolt has a relatively greater 
influence on the outcome and monitoring is easier in smaller groups than in larger groups. In 
larger groups, a single slave might have less to contribute, and by not participating, he could 
avoid the dangers of resistance and the brutal punishments meted out if revolt failed. Past 
research is consistent with this hypothesis. Using a univariate difference in means test, Behrendt, 
Eltis, and Richardson (2001, 458) find that vessels that experienced rebellion carried fewer 
slaves per ton and fewer slaves per crewmember. In addition, vessels that experienced revolts 
were more likely to have a lower ratio of male slaves, a finding they deem ‘counterintuitive.’ 
Replicating this analysis with our data yields an average of 263 slaves for ships experiencing a 
revolt and 305 slaves for those that did not.  
We first examine the effect of the total number of slaves on revolt with seven different 
logit regressions, using the total imputed number of slaves variable provided by the Voyages 
dataset. This allows us to control for other possible explanations of revolt, including African 
region, the percentage of slaves who were children, the number of crew at the outset of the 
voyage in Europe, crew deaths during the Middle Passage, and crew deaths on the African coast. 
All but two of these variables are drawn directly from the slave trade dataset and have been 
identified in past research as being associated with shipboard insurrection. To measure the 
influence of region, which has been identified as the single most important factor in the 
incidence of revolts, we created a dummy variable of the three Upper Guinea regions, 
Senegambia, Sierra Leone, and the Windward Coast. These regions are grouped together because 
they accounted ‘for just over 10 per cent of the slaves leaving Africa; however, over 40 per cent 
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of the voyages with slaves revolts came from these regions’ (Behrendt et al, 2001, 457- 466). 
Thus, we include Upper Guinea as a regional control, since past research has identified it as one 
of the key variables explaining Middle Passage slave revolt. Days spent slaving measures the 
days spent along the African coast, which may be important since longer loading times on the 
coast imply more exposure to risk of revolt (Behrendt et al, 2001, 458; Richardson, 2001, 76).10 
The days spent slaving variable is calculated following a formula that also includes the tonnage 
of the ship. Table 2 displays the regression results for our first hypothesis. 
The first column (1) reports estimates of revolt for the fixed effects of total number of 
slaves, days spent slaving, and Upper Guinea. This control captures the potential importance of 
days spent along the African coast since it has been argued that slaving vessels along the coast 
were more prone to rebellion due to African deficiencies in maritime navigation, and the regional 
impact of slaves taken from Senegambia, Sierra Leone, and the Windward Coast. In this 
specification, the estimated relationship between total number of slaves onboard and revolt is 
negative and statistically significant. By controlling for the Upper Guinea region, our findings 
suggest that the Upper Guinea region is important as a determinant for revolt. As expected, as the 
number of days spent along the African coast increases, slaves are more likely to revolt. The 
second column (2) controls for all of the previous factors with the addition of percentage 
children, which was identified as statistically significant to revolt in earlier statistical analysis 
(Behrendt et al 2001, 558). Controlling for these variables, no variable is statistically significant; 
however, the estimated relationship between total number of slaves and revolts still remains 
negative. One concern with the estimates in column (2) is the substantial drop in observations 
and the large standard error of the percentage children variable. Because the age of slaves was 
10 Because days spent slaving is something that few ships recorded and because total days was typically dependent 
on the size of the ship, we utilize the equation provided by Behrendt et al (2001, 458) to calculate the total number 
of days spent along the African coast. 
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infrequently reported, these results may be affected by reporting bias which could explain the 
difference in significance between columns (1) and (2).  
  Column (3) controls for the total number of slaves, days spent along the African coast, 
the regional variable Upper Guinea, and the number of crew at the outset of the voyage. This is 
used to capture the possible influence of the relative strength of the crew in revolt. The estimated 
relationship between total number of slaves and revolt remains negative and statistically 
significant. The Upper Guinea region and the days spent along the coast also remain positive and 
statistically significant. Building on the idea of crew strength accounted for in column (3), the 
next treatments (4) and (5) include an additional control variable to account for the differences in 
crew deaths during the entire voyage. The results show a positive association between the 
likelihood of revolt and the number of crew deaths. However, because we expect a greater 
number of crew deaths on vessels that experienced revolt, it is important to point out that ‘crew 
mortality was…as much an effect as a cause of revolts’ (Behrendt et al, 2001, 462). The potential 
for error created by the inclusion of total crew deaths during the Middle Passage cannot be 
ignored, but it is worth noting that the total number of slaves maintains its negative relationship 
and statistical significance with revolt.  
Columns (5) and (6) include control variables for sailor deaths along the African coast. 
This controls for possible differences in the reduction of crew strength because of illness and 
death along the African coast. Again, it is impossible to know if crew deaths along the African 
coast were a potential cause or effect of rebellion. Moreover, the large reductions in the number 
of observations removes statistical significance for all variables, except for negative relationship 
associated with the total number of slaves onboard.  Column (7) controls for all of the variables 
used in Behrendt, Eltis, and Richardson (2001, 460)—with the addition of total number of slaves 
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and the elimination of the percentage of slaves who were male. These results also find that the 
only variable that remains statistically significant is total number of slaves.11 
Table 3 reports the marginal effects at the mean of the independent variables. Consistent 
with the coefficients reported in Table 2, the slope of the probability curve indicates a negative 
relationship between the total number of slaves and revolt while also remaining statistically 
significant in all but one regression. The results in Table 3 indicate that adding an additional 100 
slaves, holding all other variables equal to their mean values, decreases the probability of revolt 
between 0.007 and 0.028. When the probability of revolt in the aggregate data is at most 10 
percent and more realistically 2 percent, a change of 0.7 percent to 2.8 percent suggests this is an 
important influence.  While the number of days spent slaving and the Upper Guinea variable are 
less robust than the total number of slaves, when they are statistically significant, they also have 
economic significance.  
These results are generally supportive of the first hypothesis. The estimated magnitudes 
of the relationship between total number of slaves and revolt are not only statistically significant 
and in the predicted direction, but also have practical significance. The percent change in odds 
for a one unit increase in total slaves is associated with between -0.2 percent to -0.8 percent 
chance of revolt. For illustrative purposes, with the addition of one hundred slaves to the vessel, 
the estimated odds of revolt would decrease anywhere from 20 percent to 80 percent, holding all 
other variables constant.12 In regressions one and three (which contain the most observations) the 
range of percent change in the estimated odds of revolt for the addition of one slave is -0.3 
percent to -0.6 percent. In sum, when controlling for other influences, a smaller total number of 
slaves onboard is associated with more slave revolts. 
11  Crews were not more lax when they had relatively fewer slaves aboard. Slave crews remained vigilant, 
recognizing that slaves “were frequently plotting insurrections” and more importantly in terms of numbers  “if a 
vessel has but thirty slaves they are for attempting to rise” (Francis, 1716; Newton, 1788, 54-80; as saw in Taylor, 
2006, 83). 
12 For methods used to interpret economic significance see Long and Freese (2006, 177-181) 
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To test the robustness of this finding, we can also examine how the likelihood of revolt 
varied based on the number of male slaves onboard. Since the initial—and most dangerous—
stages of resistance required the greatest physical demands, male slaves were the key actors 
involved in producing the public good. They had to battle armed crewmembers, faced a 
substantial risk of harm in the process, and torture and death in the case of failure. A smaller 
number of male slaves will more easily overcome the collective action problem because 
monitoring is less costly and each individual’s contribution is more important.13 Table 4 displays 
the regression results when including data on the number of male slaves, and Table 5 reports the 
marginal effects. 
These tests control for the same variables as the results in Tables 2 and 3, except total 
number of slaves onboard is replaced by the total number of male slaves onboard. Consistent 
with the second hypothesis, in all of the treatments in both the logit regression and the marginal 
effects of the independent variables, the number of male slaves onboard has a negative and 
statistically significant relationship with the likelihood of revolt. The probability of revolt 
decreases with an increase in the number of male slaves. However, because of the large number 
of observations dropped with inclusion of data on the number of male slaves, the number of days 
spent slaving and the Upper Guinea region are no longer significant.  
Table 5 reports the marginal effects at the mean of the independent variables for the total 
number of male slaves. Like with the coefficients reported in Table 4, the slope of the probability 
curve denotes a negative relationship between the total number of male slaves and revolt while 
also remaining statistically significant in all regressions. The results in Table 5 indicate that 
13  Gaspar has identified the ‘supportive functions of women within the slave community’ and the 
‘nonconfrontational resistance’ of women who through child rearing were the ‘principal shapers of the culture of 
resistance’ while on land (1996, 232). The act of insurrection aboard ships, however, required confrontational 
resistance to overthrow the white captors.  
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adding an additional 100 male slaves onboard, holding all other variables equal to their mean 
values, reduces the probability of revolt between 3.0 and 4.6 percent.  
As with total number of slaves, the number of male slaves onboard is not only 
statistically significant in the proper direction, but has real world significance. Calculating the 
change in percentage in odds for a one unit increase in total male slaves, each additional male 
slave has the effect of a percent change in the odds of revolt ranging from -0.9 percent to -1.0 
percent. If we interpret the relationship as causal, an addition of fifty male slaves to the vessel, 
would decrease the odds of revolt by at least 45 percent and as much as 50 percent, holding all 
other variables constant. Moreover, when controlling for the total number of males and the 
variables hypothesized as potential causes of revolt by historians, no other values remain 
statistically significant.  
 
4.2. Slave homogeneity 
During the Middle Passage, the degree of homogeneity among the slaves was important to acting 
collectively. Historically, norms of solidarity provide an important method of mitigating the free 
rider problem of revolutionaries (Goldstone 1994). Mechanisms that facilitate self-enforcing 
exchange often reduce social distance so people can reduce their perceived heterogeneity 
(Leeson, 2005). While slaves certainly shared a common goal, solidarity was less effective 
because ‘those around them were complete strangers with bizarre customs and indecipherable 
languages’ (Taylor, 2006, 25). Though some similarities in language and culture may have 
existed in western and central African communities, they were incredibly diverse and included 
more than fifty different language communities according to modern classification (Thornton, 
1998, 186).  
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The second hypothesis suggests that the more homogenous slaves were—the more slaves 
that came from fewer language and cultural groups—the easier it would be to affect collective 
action and revolt. Because of the lack of suitable data to measure the homogeneity of slave 
groups, this part of our analysis draws on qualitative, primary documents and the work of 
historians.14  
Ship captains and other professionals involved in the slave trade provide support for the 
importance of homogeneity. They recognized the danger of cultural and lingual homogeneity and 
attempted to ‘choose them [slaves] from severall parts of ye Country, of different Languages; so 
that they find they cannot act jointly’ (Rediker, 2007, 57). Slavers purchased people of varying 
language groups in an attempt to have ‘every Sort on board, [so] there will be no more likelihood 
of their succeeding in a Plot, than finishing the tower of Babel’ (Smith 1744, 28) Royal African 
Company surveyor William Smith understood the diversity of African languages contending 
further that the languages of Senegambia were ‘so many and so different…that the natives, on 
either side of the [Gambia] River cannot understand each other’ (Smith, 1744, 28; Rediker, 2007, 
276). John Atkins similarly understood that ‘further management and caution [was] to be taken 
with slaves on board…[one] shall intermix [the slaves]…because cautions where a cargo is of 
one Language, is so much the more requisite’ (Atkins, 1734, 171-172). The Captain of the 
English ship Ferrers was warned ‘that as he had on board so many negroes of one Town and 
Languages, it required the utmost care and Management to keep them from mutinying’ 
(Snelgrave, 1734, 187; Rediker, 2007, 277; Taylor, 2006, 81). By collecting slaves from many 
14 While the Voyages database provides the number of slaves shipped from each coastal country, this does not 
accurately indicate where slaves actually originated (Nunn, 2008, 145). Nunn’s important work on the effect of 
slavery on African underdevelopment overcomes this data deficiency using a variety of sources, such as “records of 
sale, slave registers, slave runaway notices, court records, church records, and notarial documents” all pointing to 
the ethnicity of the slaves (2008, 146; see also Nunn 2007 and Nunn and Wantchekon 2011). We cannot replicate 
this method because most of these records were documented after the slaves had landed in the Americas and thus 
prohibits examination at the time of voyage. There is currently insufficient information to calculate the number of 
slaves from a particular language or cultural group at the vessel level  
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parts of Africa, slavers hoped to squash any chance of rebellion.15 Captains understood that 
‘people from different language groups may have been unable to communicate effectively with 
one another, making the planning of a rebellion nearly impossible, even when it was a mutually 
desired goal’ (Taylor, 2006, 80).  
Slaves from different language and cultural groups struggled even to coordinate to 
accomplish simple tasks. Describing his interaction with a freed African in the 1780’s, 
abolitionist John Riland noted the scars where the slave’s ‘flesh look[ed] seamed and rugged’ 
because the slave had been chained to another slave during the Middle Passage and they did ‘not 
well understand each other’s language,’ causing them to do ‘exactly contrary to what [each 
other] meant’ (Riland, 1827, 22-24). Captain James Bowen noted when ‘Men of different 
Nations’ were locked together, they would often fight against each other (Bowen, 1789; as cited 
in Rediker, 2007, 272). By shackling men of different language groups together, the captains 
hoped to avoid the ‘risk [of] cooperation and hence conspiracy’ instead electing to ‘shackle men 
of different races and risk fighting, disorder, and injury’ (Rediker, 2007, 272). Different language 
and cultural groups struggled to cooperate to accomplish tasks as simple as moving while below 
the deck, suggesting that collectively rebelling against a vigilant, armed crew was especially 
difficult. This fact has led one historian to note, ‘the whites have no greater security than the 
diversity of the negroes’ languages’ (Wood, 1975, 180). 
Looking at specific instances of rebellion highlights the confounding effects of diverse 
languages and cultures. In reference to a mutiny aboard the Elizabeth in 1721, Captain William 
Snelgrave notes that the ship’s Cooper was found ‘lying on his back, quite dead’ because of 
insurrectionists (Snelgrave, 1734, 177-179). However, the slaves currently onboard (the others 
15 It’s important to note that even though slavers attempted to purchase Africans among distinct cultural and 
language groups, they were able to accomplish this without leaving their first port of embarkation, in large part 
because of the cultural and linguistic diversity of Africa. In fact, for the entire slave trade only about 12% of 
voyages documented traveling to a second African port to purchase slaves.  
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had apparently escaped) knew nothing of the matter; for there had been no design of mutinying 
amongst them because of the more than ‘one hundred of the Negroes then on board, being 
bought [from] Windward, did not understand a word of the Gold Coast Language, and so had not 
been involved in the plot.’ (Snelgrave, 1734, 177-179). Had the one hundred Windward Coast 
slaves understood the language of the Gold Coast slaves, it might have been possible for them to 
escape as well (Snelgrave 1734, 180).  
Compounding these problems further, many slaves saw other language, ethnic, and 
cultural groups as enemies (Rediker, 2006, 295). Looking at the three Gold Coast groups for 
instance, ‘whenever insurrections have occurred on board of slave ships…as the Fantees and 
Asshantees were invariably the promoters of them, the Chambas, as if to be revenged on them 
[for the history of the other two groups in enslaving the Chambas], always assisted the crews in 
suppressing these mutinies, and keeping them [the Fantees and Asshantees] in subjection’ 
(Adams, 1823, 9; Rediker, 2006, 272). Because of cultural differences, one African cultural 
group decided not only to abstain from rebelling against their white captors, but also to interfere 
with the rebellion so that the other ethnic group could not gain power. This level of collective 
failure was not reserved to these specific groups. Aboard the ‘English Vessel Brome, an 
intriguing report noted simply that when the ‘Jollofes rose, the Bambaras sided with the master’’ 
(Eltis, 2000, 229 in Taylor, 2006, 80). On yet another occasion, a captain upon discovering an 
insurrectionary plot ‘made inquiries and learned that the Crepes were unwilling to take sides with 
those [Akwambo slaves] planning the evil’ (Svalesen, 2000, 114). Heterogeneity prevented slave 
revolt by thwarting communication among conspirators and the distrust or hatred among regional 
rivals. 
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5. Conclusion 
Slaves faced tremendous physical and psychological abuse during their capture, sale, and 
transport across the Middle Passage. The horror of this historical period, what W. E. B. DuBois 
called the “most magnificent drama in the last thousand years of human history,” can be difficult 
to comprehend. We suggest a rational choice theory of slave revolt that emphasizes the collective 
action problem to understand when slaves were able to revolt. Using quantitative evidence on 
slave voyages from 1750 to 1775, this paper argues that the collective action problem was an 
important impediment to slave revolt. Slave ships with fewer slaves and fewer male slaves were 
more likely to revolt because they could monitor against free riding and induce greater 
participation. Our finding suggests that explanations that rely entirely on “African-based” causes 
for revolt, like social, religious, and political conditions peculiar to certain regions, are less 
important explanations for revolt than slaves’ ability to overcome the collective action problem. 
Relying on historical and archival materials, we also argue that the greater degree of 
homogeneity facilitated revolt. Ship captains actively sought to diversify their purchases with 
slaves from different regions so that collective action would be more difficult.  
Slaves could not rely on most of the solutions commonly used by rebels to produce the 
public good of revolt, including assistance from outsider donors and patrons, improving 
effectiveness by reorganizing, recruiting new participants, increasing competition among 
enemies to thwart their oppression, exiting, increasing access to resources, or lowering their 
costs. Because slaves could not rely on these solutions, the only way to secure their freedom was 
the contractual solution that emerged from self-organization. Slaves produced self-organized 
solutions in an attempt to save their lives, recapture their freedom, and in a few rare cases, return 
to Africa.  
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS  
Variable Name Min. Max. Avg. Std. Dev. Obs. Definition  
Dependent Variable 
   
 
       Slave Revolt 0 1 0.03 0.158 5946 =1 if slave insurrection occurred, planned but thwarted, and "cut-off" 
Independent Variables 
   
 
       Total Slaves 1 936 265.58 128 5822 The total number of slaves onboard the slaving vessel  
     Total Males 13 432 154.27 84.5 667 The total number of male slaves onboard the slaving vessel 
     Upper Guinea  0 1 0.25 0.432 5946 =1 if slaves are from Senegambia, Sierra Leone, or Windward Coast  
     Days Spent Slaving 119.93 168.34 134.05 6.55 4650 Calculated value for days spent along the African coast 
     Percentage Children 0 0.92 0.28 0.142 606 The ratio of children compared to adult slaves onboard  
     Crew at Outset 2 164 29.60 12.4 3493 The number of crew at European departure  
     Crew Died 0 68 6.72 6.48 956 The number of crew deaths throughout the entire voyage  
     Crew Deaths African Coast 0 40 3.06 3.86 716 The number of crew deaths while on the African coast  
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TABLE 2 
ONBOARD SLAVE RESISTANCE 
LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS FOR TOTAL SLAVES 
 Coefficient (Standard error) 
Independent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant 
 
-10.914*** 
(1.868) 
 
 
-4.456 
(3.993) 
 
 
-9.968*** 
(2.502) 
 
 
-10.112*** 
(3.355) 
 
 
-7.868 
(7.146) 
 
 
-10.374 
(7.461) 
 
 
-9.814 
(7.683) 
 
Total Number of 
Slaves 
 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
 
 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
-0.006 ** 
(0.003) 
 
 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
 
 
-.008 ** 
(0.003) 
 
Days Spent Slaving 0.058*** (0.014) 
 
0.020 
(0.030) 
 
 
0.050** 
(0.020) 
 
 
0.060** 
(0.026) 
 
 
0.047 
(0.054) 
 
 
0.066 
(0.056) 
 
 
0.061 
(0.058) 
 
Upper Guinea 
 
0.824*** 
(0.194) 
 
 
0.423 
(0.383) 
 
 
0.748*** 
(0.224) 
 
 
1.005*** 
(0.349) 
 
 
0.808 
(0.615) 
 
 
0.565 
(0.695) 
 
 
0.605 
(0.701) 
 
Percentage Children -- 
 
-1.085 
(1.279) 
 
-- -- 
 
0.067 
(2.073) 
 
 
0.608 
(2.394) 
 
 
0.504 
(2.439) 
 
Crew at Outset -- -- 
 
0.018* 
(0.009) 
 
-- -- -- -- 
Crew Deaths 
 -- -- -- 
 
0.039*** 
(0.019) 
 
 
0.049 
(0.042) 
 
-- 
 
0.115 
(0.079) 
Crew Deaths on 
African Coast -- -- -- -- -- 
 
0.044 
(0.063) 
 
 
-0.079 
(0.105) 
 
 
Observations 
 
4550 
 
 
520 
 
 
3379 
 
 
940 
 
 
291 
 
 
250 
 
 
249 
 
 
McFadden R2 
 
 
0.034 
 
 
0.016 
 
 
0.038 
 
 
0.104 
 
 
0.097 
 
 
0.102 
 
 
0.118 
 
 
Notes: Asterisks indicate statistical significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10% 
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TABLE 3 
MARGINAL EFFECTS FOR TOTAL SLAVES 
 Marginal Effects at the Means (Standard error) 
Independent 
Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Total Number of 
Slaves 
 
-0.00007*** 
(0.00002) 
 
 
-0.00014 
(0.00012) 
 
 
-0.00010*** 
(0.00003) 
 
 
-0.00019*** 
(0.00005) 
 
 
-0.00026** 
(0.00011) 
 
 
-0.00027*** 
(0.00011) 
 
 
-0.00028*** 
(0.00010) 
 
Days Spent Slaving 0.00146*** (0.00035) 
 
0.00148 
(0.00216) 
 
 
0.00127** 
(0.00050) 
 
 
0.00206** 
(0.00089) 
 
 
0.00192 
(0.00222) 
 
 
0.00256 
(0.00216) 
 
 
0.00222 
(0.00211) 
 
Upper Guinea 
 
0.025*** 
(0.007) 
 
 
0.034 
(0.034) 
 
 
0.022*** 
(0.008) 
 
 
0.048** 
(0.023) 
 
 
0.045 
(0.045) 
 
 
0.027 
(0.040) 
 
 
0.027 
(0.040) 
 
Percentage Children -- 
 
-0.079 
(0.093) 
 
-- -- 
 
0.003 
(0.086) 
 
 
0.024 
(0.093) 
 
 
0.018 
(0.089) 
 
Crew at Outset -- -- 
 
0.0004* 
(0.00023) 
 
-- -- -- -- 
Crew Deaths 
 -- -- -- 
 
0.001** 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.002 
(0.002) 
 
-- 
 
0.004 
(0.003) 
Crew Deaths on 
African Coast -- -- -- -- -- 
 
0.002 
(0.002) 
 
 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
 
 
Observations 
 
4550 
 
 
520 
 
 
3379 
 
 
940 
 
 
291 
 
 
250 
 
 
249 
 
 
Marginal Effects 
after logit regression 
 
     0.026  0.079        0.026       0.036 
 
0.043 
 
     0.040 
 
0.038 
 
 
Notes: Asterisks indicate statistical significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10% 
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TABLE 4 
ONBOARD SLAVE RESISTANCE 
LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS FOR TOTAL MALES 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Independent 
Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant 
-7.295* 
(3.2847) 
 
-5.6195 
(3.999) 
 
-5.80 
(4.899) 
 
-7.318 
(6.14) 
 
--6.228 
(6.659) 
 
-9.124 
(7.277) 
 
-8.334 
(7.549) 
 
Number of Male 
Slaves 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
 
-0.0066*** 
(0.002) 
 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
 
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.012** 
(0.007) 
 
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
 
Days Spent 
Slaving 
0.040 
(0.024) 
0.0320 
(0.027) 
 
0.023 
(0.040) 
 
0.042 
(0.046) 
 
0.034 
(0.004) 
 
0.055 
(0.053) 
 
0.047 
(0.055) 
 
Upper Guinea 
0.320 
(0.359) 
 
0.331 
(0.3655) 
 
0.607 
(0.428) 
 
0.763 
(0.601) 
 
0.769 
(0.606) 
 
0.549 
(0.688) 
 
0.599 
(0.693) 
 
Percentage 
Children -- 
-1.221 
(1.253) 
 
-- -- 
-0.0384 
(1.95) 
 
0.763 
(2.30) 
 
0.8169 
(2.33) 
 
Crew at Outset -- -- 
0.0331 
(0.0253) 
 
-- -- -- -- 
Crew Deaths -- -- -- 
0.037 
(0.042) 
 
0.039 
(0.042) 
 
-- 0.0816 (0.076) 
Crew Deaths on 
Coast -- -- -- -- -- 
0.035 
(0.062) 
 
-0.048 
(0.098) 
 
 
Observations 
 
594 
 
517 436 298 291 250 249 
 
McFadden R2 
 
0.0304 0.0385 0.050 0.011 0.116 0.116 0.125 
 
Notes: Asterisks indicate statistical significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10% 
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TABLE 5 
MARGINAL EFFECTS FOR TOTAL MALES 
 Marginal Effects at the Means (Standard error) 
Independent 
Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Number of Male 
Slaves 
-0.00038*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.00046*** 
(0.00016) 
-0.00045*** 
(0.00017) 
-0.0004** 
(0.00013) 
-0.00041** 
(0.00013) 
-0.00041** 
(0.00014) 
-0.0040** 
(0.00013) 
Days Spent Slaving 0.003 (0.001) 
 
0.002 
(0.0018) 
 
 
0.0014 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.0015 
(0.0017) 
 
 
0.002 
(0.0018) 
 
 
0.002 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.002 
(0.002) 
 
Upper Guinea 
 
0.0225 
(0.027) 
 
 
0.0247 
(0.0296) 
 
 
0.049 
(0.037) 
 
 
0.037 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.038 
(0.039) 
 
 
0.024 
(0.036) 
 
 
0.025 
(0.0365) 
 
Percentage Children -- 
 
-0.0836  
(0.084) 
 
-- -- 
 
-0.0014 
 (0.072) 
 
 
0.027 
(0.081) 
 
 
0.028 
(0.0277) 
 
Crew at Outset -- -- 
 
0.002 
(0.002) 
 
-- -- -- -- 
Crew Deaths 
 -- -- -- 
 
0.001 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.0014 
(0.002) 
 
-- 
 
0.0028 
(0.003) 
Crew Deaths on 
African Coast -- -- -- -- -- 
 
0.001 
(0.002) 
 
 
-0.0016 
(0.003) 
 
 
Observations 
 
594 
 
 
517 
 
 
436 
 
 
298 
 
 
291 
 
 
250 
 
 
249 
 
Marginal Effects 
after logit regression 
 
     0.069           0.074        0.066       0.038 
 
0.038 
 
     0.036 
 
0.035 
 
 
Notes: Asterisks indicate statistical significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10% 
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